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 1 
Abstract—This paper presents a first attempt to use Dempster-Shafer (D-S) evidence theory for the fault diagnosis of 2 
wind turbine (WT) on SCADA alarm data. As two important elements in D-S evidence theory, identification framework (IF) 3 
and Basic Probability Assignment (BPA) are derived from WT maintenance records and SCADA alarm data. A procedure 4 
of multi-dimensional information fusion for WT fault diagnosis is presented. The diagnosis accuracy using BPAs obtained 5 
from a sample WT and from the wind farm are compared and evaluated. The result shows that D-S evidence theory as a 6 
multidimensional information processing method is useful for WT fault diagnosis. Compared to previous SCADA alarms 7 
processing methods, the approach proposed predominates at aspects of simple calculation, superior capability on dealing 8 
with large volume of alarms through quantifying fault probabilities. It has the advantages of being easy to perform, low 9 
cost and explainable, which make it ideal for online application.  A self-BPA-generating procedure for future online 10 
application with this approach is also provided in this paper. It is concluded that D-S evidence theory applied to SCADA 11 
alarm analysis is a valuable approach to intelligent wind farm management. 12 
 13 
 14 
Index Terms—Wind Turbine, SCADA Alarm, Fault Diagnosis, Multi-dimensional Information Processing, D-S Evidence 15 
Theory. 16 
 17 
I. INTRODUCTION 18 
ind farms are generally located in remote areas with a harsh operational environment. For current designs, wind turbine 19 
(WT) nacelles are typically located at 60 -120m height for wind farms installed both onshore and offshore. Limited 20 
accessibility leads to high costs for the operation and maintenance of wind farms. WTs are generally considered to have a 21 
20 years working life; statistics shows that their operation and maintenance costs are estimated to account for 10%-15% of the 22 
total wind farm income1,2. For an offshore wind farm, the operation and maintenance costs are even higher; around 14%-30% of 23 
total wind farm project costs3. Maintenance costs strongly affect the net economic value of a wind farm4. Therefore, reducing this 24 
cost through optimization of wind turbine design and the construction of a sound operation and maintenance management strategy 25 
are essential to maintain wind power competitiveness5,6. 26 
Developing effective condition monitoring or online fault diagnosis is critical for efficient wind farm management7. This 27 
requires scientific methods to improve fault detection accuracy and to deliver realistic residual life predictions for machine and 28 
components. Currently, data driven fault detection and diagnosis methods are attracting intensive research attention. Such an 29 
approach can be classified into three main categories: model-based, signal-based and knowledge based methods8-10. Considerable 30 
progress has been made on model-based wind turbine fault detection9,11, which has demonstrated its advantages for understanding 31 
system operational principles and then extracting fault features. But for a WT system, which is essentially a complex system, it 32 
needs significant further effort to construct comprehensive system models for quantitative and qualitative analysis. Process history 33 
and search strategy methods use advanced data processing methods or artificial intelligence techniques to diagnose WT faults. 34 
Although these approaches achieve automatic fault diagnosis, they face challenges of explaining the results, understanding the 35 
diagnosis process and then processing the outlier events12. Recently, evidence theory and vague evidence approaches have been 36 
applied to fault diagnosis/condition assessment for power systems and WTs13-17. Signals obtained from simulation or sensors are 37 
used. There is an increasing trend for using these types of methods for fault diagnosis of renewable power systems. However, the 38 
effectiveness of using such method for WTs remains unclear as the cases mentioned above are either based purely on simulation 39 
or are restricted in application to power systems.      40 
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Typically, data used for WT condition monitoring is high frequency data which requires a large storage volume. For high 41 
frequency data, such as vibration signals, common analysis approaches include Fourier Transform18, Fast Fourier Transform19, and 42 
wavelet transform20. These signal processing approaches require complex calculations that impact on real-time fault diagnosis 43 
performance. In addition, these approaches are applicable on limited failure modes. While, SCADA data, which is low frequency 44 
data, has attracted considerable research attention due to its in effect zero cost, and its potential for real-time WT condition 45 
monitoring and fault diagnosis21-26. Fuzzy inference theory and evidence theory have been successfully applied to SCADA signals 46 
(temperature, wind speed, output power etc.) for WT condition assessment25. New methodologies such as co-integration analysis 47 
of SCADA data for condition monitoring and fault diagnosis for WTs have also been used26. Most researchers have focused on 48 
using SCADA signals rather than SCADA alarms which are also recorded in WT SCADA system. The use of SCADA alarm 49 
signals for fault diagnosis was proposed 4 to 5 years ago. Methods using probability-based Venn diagrams and artificial neural 50 
networks have been investigated27, 28. Although the association of WT SCADA alarms with specific failures can be made the Venn 51 
diagram approach is not able to quantify failure probability. The use of artificial neural networks for alarm analysis is limited due 52 
to its exponential dependence on data volume. Recently, a classification method has been adopted to analyze WT SCADA alarms29 53 
however its fault prediction accuracy is in need of improvement.  54 
Motivated by these shortcomings, this paper proposes a new method based on D-S evidence theory to quantify failure probability 55 
from SCADA alarms. This is a decision level and multidimensional information fusion method for fault diagnosis. The procedure 56 
for quantification of failure probability is presented. It provides useful information for wind farm operators to assist them in making 57 
decisions and to organize maintenance activities. In this study the historical maintenance records are taken as the identification 58 
framework and the associated basic probability assignment (BPA) is extracted from the SCADA alarm data. An improved D-S 59 
evidence theory approach is developed to diagnose faults. A verification case is presented to prove the effectiveness of this method. 60 
II. WIND TURBINE ALARMS AND MAINTENANCES  61 
A. WT Alarm System  62 
Alarm information is stored in the SCADA database. Alarms are triggered and recorded when key component signals exceed 63 
threshold limits27. In time domain, from a data storage perspective an alarm signal can be considered as a semi discrete signal. The 64 
occurrences of SCADA alarms can be recorded as binary signals. That is, the occurrences of an alarm are recorded as 1 while lack 65 
of alarm is recorded as 0. From this point of view, there are considerable savings in data storage space required compared to a 66 
conventional Condition Monitoring System (CMS).  67 
WT SCADA alarms can be classified into four categories27: general alarms; system operation alarms; environmental alarms; 68 
and communication/software alarms to indicate component malfunction, an abnormal environment or system operational states. 69 
Normally, wind farm operators use SCADA alarms as emergency event indicators which assist them in mitigating risk. Alarms 70 
may also result in WT shut down. In this paper, alarms for monitoring the WT pitch system are considered. The alarms being 71 
considered are list in Table I. The alarm names indicate possible abnormal states of the system or the location where possible 72 
failure occurs. Some remarks are also provided. It can be seen that alarms a69, a72-a74, b54 are general alarms relating to the pitch 73 
system, whilst alarms a15, b67, b68, b69, b86-88 are associated with the communication system. Alarms b55, and b80-b82 occur 74 
when the three independent pitch positions are not coherent but these give no clear indication of the type of possible failures. 75 
Alarms a93-a95 and b56 provide warnings linked to the pitch system battery charger. Alarms b71-b73 related to the 24 volt supply. 76 
Some alarms, for example a72-a74, a93-a95, b71-b73, b80-b82, b86-b88, are grouped together because they correspond to the 77 
same signal from different blades.  78 
TABLE I 79 
LIST OF ALARMS IN THIS PAPER  80 
Alarm ID Alarm Name  
 
Remarks 
a15 Pitch don't answer Pitch communication lost 
a69 Pitch Pitch warning 
a72-a74 Blade 1-3 Emergency Blade 1-3 are in emergency 
a93-a95 Battery for blade 1 - 3 Pitch battery abnormal 
b54 General Pitch Warning  General warning 
b55 Pitch Incoherence  The pitch angle incoherence 
 
b56 Battery Charger 
Pitch blade battery charger 
abnormal 
 
b67 Pitch 1-3 Can bus  
Pitch 1-3 communication bus 
problem 
b68 Pitch Can bus  Communication bus abnormal 
b69 Pitch Device net  Pitch Device net warning 
b70 Pitch position Blade position abnormal 
b71-b73 Pitch 24v 24 volts line abnormal 
 
b80-b82 Pitch 1-3 Incoherence  
The three pitch angles are 
incoherent 
b86-b88 Pitch 1-3 Can  Communication signal abnormal 
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 81 
B. Maintenance Records  82 
Although in online application maintenance record is not strictly necessary it is important for the development and testing stage 83 
of the fault diagnosis approach because it provides critical failure cases and reports. It further provides useful hints to researchers 84 
seeking to understand the origins of failures. The maintenance record (represented as M in the latter sections) collects together the 85 
repair activities carried out by the maintenance engineers. It records the specific date, the repair or component checking activities 86 
carried out. Such activities can be classified into three types: reactive maintenance (run to failure), preventive maintenance (time-87 
based/scheduled), predictive maintenance (condition-based). In this paper, only instances of reactive maintenance are considered 88 
for fault diagnosis.  89 
Due to the complex structure of a WT, large numbers of alarms are usually triggered once a specific fault occurs which may 90 
lead to a range of reactive maintenance interventions. From the maintenance records, the time and date of the fault and any specific 91 
component failures can be obtained. Using this information, SCADA alarms occurring at the moment or immediately prior to 92 
failure can be identified. Some fault events will trigger a single alarm while some will cause alarm storms. In this paper, D-S 93 
evidence theory takes SCADA alarms as the input evidence with maintenance decisions as the output. The ultimate fault diagnosis 94 
process is illustrated as Fig. 1, where the BPA is generated by D-S evidence theory as presented in the next section.  95 
BPA
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Failure 1 
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 96 
Fig. 1.  Fault diagnosis process using alarms and D-S evidence theory generated BPA.   97 
 98 
III. D-S EVIDENCE THEORY  99 
D-S evidence theory distinguishes itself from traditional probability theory by its capability to deal with epistemic uncertainty. 100 
This makes it uniquely able to cope with the situations where it is difficult to evaluate probabilities30. WT SCADA alarms indicate 101 
operational risks. Their connections with WT failures are intrinsically probabilistic but calculation of the relevant probabilities is 102 
problematic. In addition, SCADA alarms are generated by multiple sensors which make the analysis even challenging. The 103 
capability of D-S evidence theory to combine evidence from multiple sources with different properties makes it an ideal approach 104 
for SCADA alarm analysis. In actual WT fault diagnosis, due to the variability of the WT operating environment and the nonlinear 105 
control, output data streams of a WT are often strongly random and this makes fault identification difficult. Misdiagnosis or missed 106 
detection of WT faults is unavoidable. Increasing the dimension of the input data can facilitate more comprehensive fault feature 107 
identification and can effectively reduce uncertainty in the diagnosis process. Moreover, diagnosis of possible system failure is 108 
essentially a process to quantify the likelihood of an event though it is always misunderstood as a process of affirming the 109 
conclusion. D-S evidence theory is a decision level information fusion method which is able to use multiple evidence streams to 110 
come up with probability of confidence/belief/decision31. It has the potential to provide a comprehensive diagnosis for WTs.    111 
D-S evidence theory uses "belief" to measure the tendency of evidence to support specific propositions. Through the fusion of 112 
multiple sources of evidence, the probability of supporting proposition sets are calculated. The D-S analysis procedure is outlined 113 
below30:  114 
(1) Identification framework (IF) 115 
Definition 1: Evidence theory firstly defines a set of hypotheses M as the identification framework which can be described by 116 
equation (1). Set M is defined to be a set of mutually exclusive elements f1 to fn. 117 
1 2 3 nM ={f ,f ,f ,...f }                                                            (1) 118 
At any time, an element fi is taken from M where M is known as the identification framework (IF). In this paper, it represents 119 
the maintenance activities which essentially reflect a set of failures.  120 
Definition 2: The set of all subsets of M is called the power set, as given in equation 2 121 
 M 1 2 n 1 2 1 3 1 2 32 ,{f },{f },...{f },{f Uf ,{f Uf },...{f Uf Uf },...M}            (2) 122 
where Ø is empty set.  123 
(2) Basic probability assignment (BPA) 124 
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Definition 3: Once the IF is determined, the mass function m can be defined as a mapping of the power set P(M) to a number 125 
between 0 to 1.  Mass function m is a mapping: 2M [0,1]. For any subset Mi of 2M, all have m∈[0,1]. The mass function m is 126 
also called Basic Probability Assignment (BPA) of 2M and P(M) is the basic probability number (BPN) of M. Its properties are 127 
given in equation 3 128 
M
i
i
M 2
m : P(M) [0,1]
m(M ) = 1
m( ) = 0






 

                                                                                             (3) 129 
m( ) represents the proportion of all relevant and available evidence that supports the claim that a particular element of M belongs 130 
to the set Mi but not to a particular subset of Mi. Any subset Mi of P(M) satisfying m(Mi)>0 is called a focal element.  131 
(3) Evidence fusion 132 
Definition 4: P1(Mi) and P2(Mj) are two BPAs. D-S evidence fusion process of P1(Mi) and P2(Mj) is given by equations 4,5 and 133 
6. 134 
i j
1 2
M M
i j
M
12
P (M )P (M
(M) (M )
1 K
)
m

  


                               (4) 135 
12 (M) 0 (M )m                                           (5) 136 
i j
1 i 2 j
M M
K (M ) (M )P P

                                                (6) 137 
where K represents basic probability mass associated with conflict. 138 
 (4) BPA properties 139 
The D-S evidence fusion process can be regarded as an orthogonal computation. P1 and P2 are two BPAs that are used for 140 
evidence fusion expressed as P1⊕P2=P12. 141 
BPA properties: 142 
 1 2 2 1
1 2 3 1 2 3
P P = P P
(P P ) P = P (P P )
 

   
                                                 (7) 143 
Although D-S evidence theory can obtain fusion results from multiple information streams, there are still some deficiencies in 144 
its practical fault diagnosis application32,33: 145 
①Conventional conflict problem: when serious conflict appears in the BPAs the fusion can produce unreasonable results. 146 
②One vote veto problem: when one or more inconsistent instances of evidence appear there will be a veto after the combination. 147 
These problems seriously affect the accuracy of fault diagnosis. Consequently a numbers of solutions have been proposed to 148 
deal with this. Yager34 assigns conflict to uncertainty. Murphy33 converts the evidence conflicts into arithmetic means. Yager's 149 
method classifies the conflict as uncertainty in the fault diagnosis problem which is too conservative to achieve the desired purpose. 150 
And Murphy's method did not consider the compatibility between evidence and conflict. In this paper the evidence distance method 151 
has been applied to the WT fault diagnosis problem35: 152 
(1) Evidence distance calculation 153 
In order to calculate the distance between evidences, the average BPA value of each group is required and calculated using 154 
equation 8: 155 
   
1 2 n
1
P (P P ... P )
n
                                                                  (8) 156 
In order to determine weights, the distance di from the evidence to the average evidence is calculated: 157 
1 i i 2 j j i n n- P (M )-P(M ) - P (M )-P(M ) - P (M )-P(M )
id e e ... e                 (9) 158 
The smaller the distance between any two evidences, the greater the degree of similarity. 159 
(2) Weight determination 160 
The weights are calculated from the di according to equation 10. 161 
i
i
i
i=1,2,...,n
d
c =
d
                                                  (10) 162 
Where the sum of weights, ∑ci , are equal to unity. 163 
(3) Weighted mean 164 
The formula for evidence weighted fusion is given by equation 11:  165 
1 1 2 2 n nP = c P +c P +...+c P                         (11) 166 
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IV. APPLYING D-S EVIDENCE THEORY ON WTS FAULT DIAGNOSIS 167 
 168 
In WT fault diagnosis, each alarm is treated as an item of evidence that supports different possible failures. Therefore, the BPA 169 
is essentially the conditional probability of maintenance/failure given the occurrence of certain alarm; this can be derived using 170 
Bayesian theory. Recall that Bayesian theorem describes the relationship between two conditional probabilities, and is expressed 171 
by equation 12: 172 
i i
i n
j jj 1
P(B )P(A | B )
P(B | A)
P(B )P(A | B )



                                             (12) 173 
Based on a Bayesian approach, alarms and maintenance/failure data are used to calculate the "belief"(or "support") for a set of 174 
maintenance activities Mi (linked to failures) if an alarm Aj occurs. This is calculated using equation 13:  175 
j i i
i j n
i j ii=1
P(A | M )P(M )
P(M | A ) =
P(M ) P(A | M )
                        (13) 176 
where P(Mi) is the probability of a specific repair activity, Mi . i is index of the associated fault. P(Aj|Mi) is the probability that 177 
a specific alarm, Aj, occurs given the precondition of maintenance, Mi,  with j the index of the alarm. P(Mi|Aj) is the posterior 178 
probability and BPA obtained by D-S evidence theory. 179 
In this process, the central role of D-S evidence theory is to extract the BPA by using a Bayesian network approach36,37.  It is 180 
then possible to aggregate the evidence from multiple alarms using equations 4, 5 and 6 to estimate the failure probability. Although 181 
D-S evidence theory is able in theory to distinguish between "unknown" and "impossible", in this study the zero elements of BPA 182 
does not differentiate these two cases. Therefore, the calculation results obtained in this paper only evaluate the likelihood of the 183 
failure and cannot exclude the impossibility of the failure.  184 
In this section, two years of wind farm SCADA alarms and maintenance records are used to perform the fault diagnosis. The 185 
analysis procedure outlined below. 186 
Step1: Determination of Identification Framework (IF) 187 
Using WT A339 as example, the IF can be obtained from its maintenance records. Four types of maintenance are recorded: 188 
"Screw"; "Pitch Failure"; "Bolt"; and "Others". These failures are related to the WT pitch system. “Screw” and “Bolt” are specific 189 
failed components in the pitch system, while the other two failures are general descriptions relating to pitch failure within the 190 
records. The dates when maintenance was undertaken for this WT are listed in Table II. 191 
P(M1), P(M2), P(M3), and P(M4) are the probabilies each identified pitch failure as indexed by Mi. The probability is calculated 192 
from the frequency of occurence. From the occurences of Table II these probabilities are: P(M1)=0.166, P(M2)=0.5, P(M3)=0.166, 193 
P(M4)=0.166. The resulting power set 2M ,excluding the empty set, is: 194 
 2 {Screw},{Pitch Failure},{Bolt},{Others}M   195 
TABLE II 196 
A339 MAINTENANCE RECORDS 197 
WT Maintenance  
 
Date of Occurrence  
 
ID 
A339 Pitch Failure 2007/9/2       M2 
A339 Pitch Failure 2008/1/25       M2 
A339 Screw 2008/2/2       M1 
A339 Others 2008/2/28       M4 
A339 Pitch Failure 2008/6/6       M2 
A339 Bolt 2008/6/26       M3 
 198 
Step2: Extracting the BPA 199 
(1) Alarm occurrence frequency analysis  200 
Table III shows the frequency of alarms related to the four faults for WT A339. It shows the total number of occurrences of the 201 
alarms (with the IDs listed in the first column) for the different failures. For example, the first number 2 indicates that for identified 202 
Pitch Failure, alarm a15 has occurred twice.   203 
TABLE III 204 
A339 MAINTENANCE RECORDS 205 
Alarm ID Pitch Failure Screw Bolt Others 
a15 2 0 0 3 
a69 13 5 3 10 
a72-a74 9 3 3 12 
b54 3 2 0 5 
b55 0 1 0 0 
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b68 2 0 0 1 
b69 0 1 0 0 
b71-b72 2 0 0 1 
b81 1 0 0 0 
b86-b88 3 0 0 6 
 206 
 (2) Obtain P(A|M) 207 
From the maintenance statistics and alarm frequencies, the probability of a specific alarm preconditioned by a specific 208 
maintenance activity can be obtained using equation 12. The results for WT A339 are given in Table IV. 209 
TABLE IV 210 
 P(AJ|MI) OF A339 211 
Alarm ID Pitch Failure Screw Bolt Others 
a15 0.057  0  0 0.079  
a69 0.371  0.417  0.5 0.263  
a72-a74 0.257  0.250  0.5 0.316  
b54 0.086  0.167  0 0.132  
b55 0 0.083  0 0 
b68 0.057  0 0 0.026  
b69 0 0.083  0 0 
b71-b72 0.057  0 0 0.026  
b81 0.029  0 0 0 
b86-b88 0.086  0 0 0.158  
   212 
 (3) Obtain P(M|A)/Extracting BPA 213 
The BPA is calculated according to equation 13 and the results shown in Table V. This would seem to show that certain alarms, 214 
for example b55, b69 and b81, can give an unambiguous indication of the specific failure, ie Screw and Pitch Failure. But in fact, 215 
two different situations could give rise to these results: 216 
①The alarm has strong correspondence to the failure. When this alarm occurs, a failure can be identified and then maintenance 217 
can be planned. 218 
②The alarm seldom occurs. Within the time period of available data, its low occurrence leads to the result observed.  219 
As the two situations cannot be distinguished, then these alarms are filtered out as special cases. The alarms and the required 220 
maintenance are written in the form of A- M as shown: b55→Screw, b69→Screw, b81→Pitch Failure. This essentially means 221 
P(Mi|Aj)=1. 222 
TABLE V 223 
 P(MI|AJ) (OR BPA) FOR TURBINE A339 224 
Alarm ID Pitch Failure Screw Bolt Others 
a15 0.685 0 0 0.315 
a69 0.26 0.097 0.582 0.062 
a72-a74 0.201 0.065 0.652 0.083 
b54 0.463 0.3 0 0.237 
b55 0 1 0 0 
b68 0.867 0 0 0.133 
b69 0 1 0 0 
b71-b72 0.867 0 0 0.133 
b81 1 0 0 0 
b86-b88 0.62 0 0 0.38 
 225 
Step 3: D-S evidence fusion 226 
Once alarms occur for a WT, the D-S evidence fusion procedure is carried out to provide fault diagnosis. The calculation 227 
undertaken uses equations 4 to 11. As there are numbers of alarms, which are treated as evidence to supoort specific faults/failures; 228 
the calculation is essentially a two dimentional procedure and the calculation results are shown in Table VI.  229 
TABLE VI 230 
 FAULT DIAGNOSIS RESULT 231 
BPA 
M(Pitch 
Failure) 
M(Screw) M(Bolt) M(Others) 
a15 0.685 0 0 0.315 
a69 0.26 0.097 0.582 0.061 
a72-a74 0.201 0.065 0.652 0.082 
b54 0.463 0.3 0 0.237 
Fusion Result 0.43 0.111 0.266 0.193 
 232 
The calculation procedure can be explained as follows. A BPA matrix of P(Mi|Aj) is obtained as shown in Table V, where Mi 233 
are the different failures (as listed in the top row) and Aj are the alams (listed in the first column). When alarms occur (for example, 234 
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a15, a69, a72-a74, b54) they are extracted from table V to calculate the associated probablity of failure. A BPA matrix is contructed 235 
as shown in the first five rows of Table V. Each element in the matrix is a BPN. 236 
When the BPN has zero elements, conflicts appear. In this situation, alarms need to be classified in order to obtain reasonable 237 
fusion results. Alarms a69 and a72-a74 exhibit no conflicts and then they can fused firstly using the standard D-S evidence approach 238 
by referring to equations 4 to 6:  239 
y x
i j
j 1
i 1
1 K = P(M | A ) (x 2, y 4)


                   (14)  240 
x
i j
j 1
i
P(M | A )
m(M ) (x 2)
1 K


 

                  (15) 241 
where x=2 in this application since there are two alarms (a69 and a72-a74) and y=4 because there are 4 kinds of failures. Values 242 
of x and y depend on the number of alarms and the failures respectively.  243 
The fusion result of a69 and a72-a74 are listed in the last row of table VII. The remaining alarms (a15 and b54) exhibit conflicts. 244 
They are then fused with the fusion result obtained from a69, a72-a74 using the weighted mean approach given by equations 8 to 245 
11.  For this application these become: 246 
x
i i j
j 1
1
P(M ) = P(M | A ) (x 3)
x 
                 (16) 247 
y
j i j i
i 1
d exp[P(M | A ) P(M )] (y 4)

                (17) 248 
j
j x
j
j 1
d
c
d



                          (18) 249 
x
i i j j
j 1
m(M ) P(M | A ) c

                      (19) 250 
where cj is consistent with definition in equation (10). And x=3 is due to the fact that currently the final fusion is made by 251 
considering a15, b54 and the result obtained from a69, a72-74. The fusion result m(Mi) is also called the “belief” of failure Mi, 252 
which is used to quantify the supports for a given failure by these alarms. Then results are listed in the final row in Table VI. In 253 
this case, “belief” of “Pitch Failure” and “Bolt” are both high, which indicates a high likelihood of these two failures.  254 
TABLE VII 255 
 FAULT DIAGNOSIS RESULT 256 
BPA 
M(Pitch 
Failure) 
M(Screw) M(Bolt) M(Others) 
a15 0.685 0 0 0.315 
b54 0.463 0.3 0 0.237 
Fusion result of 
a69,a72-a74 
0.118 0.014 0.857 0.011 
 257 
V. VALIDATION OF THE METHOD  258 
In order to verify the D-S evidence fault diagnosis method described above SCADA alarm data and repair reports from13 WTs 259 
in a single wind farm are used and assessed.   260 
Firstly, the maintenance activities in the wind farm and the number of WTs failed are statistically analyzed and shown in Fig.2. 261 
It shows that the top five failure modes for a WT pitch system are pitch failure (general description), battery failure, others 262 
(general/ambiguous description), pitch converter failure and pitch motor failure. Since the failures are recorded by different 263 
maintenance engineers, some general descriptions without a clear identification of faults are observed. Over 76% WTs have 264 
experienced pitch failures and nearly 40% turbines have experienced batteries failures.  265 
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 266 
 267 
Fig. 2.  Maintenance frequency % and number of WTs involved % in the wind farm  268 
 269 
 According to the description in the previous section, a BPA can be generated from a single WT or from all the WTs in the same 270 
wind farm. The two cases are defined as:  271 
①"A representative WT's BPA": this is a BPA obtained from a specific WT in the wind farm.  272 
②" All the WTs' BPA": this is a BPA obtained from all WTs in a wind farm (calculated from all 15 different maintenance 273 
actions and all 39 possible types of alarm from the different WTs in the wind farm).  274 
A. Verification Test  275 
“Batteries Failure” is chosen as a specific outcome for verification. The dates when the maintenance record indicated “Batteries 276 
Failure” occurred are selected and the alarms present on those days are used for evidence fusion. In addition, in the tables where 277 
there is a column of A-M, M is referring to “Batteries Failures”. There are 9 WTs where “Batteries Failures” have occurred in this 278 
wind farm during the time for which data is available: A340, A341，A342, A343, A344, A345, A346, A348, A349. And for WT 279 
A343 “Batteries Failures” has occurred twice. The specific WT used to obtain the BPA is A342. Two testing BPAs are obtained 280 
and used to calculate the “Belief” in different failure modes. The results are obtained as outlined below. 281 
(1) Using "A specific WT's BPA"  282 
The maintenance record for A342 indicates that three types failure have occurred: "Pitch Failure", "Batteries Failure", "Pitch 283 
Motor Failure". The fusion result is as shown in Table VIII. In table VIII, there is a column with title ‘A-M’, which has been 284 
defined in section IV. The corresponding alarm ID of Aj is recorded in this column. In this test, Pitch Failure has the highest 285 
likelihood and Batteries Failure was ranked the second nearly for all the WTs except turbine A343.      286 
TABLE VIII 287 
 FUSION RESULTS USING "A SPECIFIC WT'S BPA"   288 
WT ID 
Pitch Motor 
Failure 
Pitch 
Failure 
Batteries 
Failure 
A-M 
A340 0.0166 0.651 0.3324 none 
A341 0.0916 0.735 0.1735 b87 
A342 0.0025 0.7616 0.236 none 
A343 0.244 0.6778 0.0782 none 
A343 0.0724 0.7554 0.1722 none 
A344 0.141 0.6998 0.1592 none 
A345 0.005 0.6766 0.3184 none 
A346 0.0166 0.651 0.3324 none 
A348 0.0916 0.735 0.1735 none 
A349 0.0724 0.7554 0.1722 none 
 289 
(2) Using "BPA of All the WTs' in wind farm"  290 
There are totally 15 types of failures in the whole wind farm. As “Batteries Failures” only are concerned in this verification 291 
study, the results are calculated and shown in Fig 3. Among the 15 types of failures, supports for "Batteries Failure" were ranked 292 
the second for 7 cases (The first rank is "Pitch Failure").  The remaining 3 cases ranked the third. Although there is some 293 
inconsistency due to ambiguous maintenance records the correct identification of the actual failure accounts for 70% of the cases.  294 
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 295 
Fig. 3.  Belief of "Batteries Failure" calculated using "BPA of All the WTs' in a wind farm" 296 
 297 
 (3) Performance evaluation 298 
To evaluate the performance of using different BPAs for fault diagnosis, their false-positive and false-negative rates are 299 
calculated. As shown in table IX, “Batteries Failure” and all “non-Batteries Failures” of pitch system are assessed.  The numbers 300 
list in the second row of table IX refer to the diagnosed “Positive” or “Negative” result for all the Batteries Failures. For all the 301 
non Batteries Failure cases, the same diagnosed result list in the third row. So the false positive rate, that is c/(c+d), is used to 302 
calculate the percentage of diagnosed Batteries Failures cases in all the actual non Batteries Failure Cases. It is essentially false 303 
diagnose rate. Fault negative rate, that is b/(a+b), is used to calculate the percentage of diagnosed non-Batteries Failures cases in 304 
all the actual Batteries Failure Cases. It is essentially miss diagnose rate.  305 
The overall accuracy is defined as equation 20. It is used to evaluate the performance of thediagnosis results with BPAs derived 306 
from different data source.  307 
Accuracy (a d) / (a b c d) 100%                    (20) 308 
 309 
TABLE IX 310 
 DEFINITION OF FALSE-POSITIVE AND FALSE-NEGATIVE RATES 311 
Category Positive Negative Total 
Batteries Failure 
Cases a b a+b 
Non Batteries 
Failure Cases c d c+d 
Total a+c b+d a+b+c+d 
False Positive  c/(c+d) False Negative  b/(a+b) 
 312 
For Table IX, some statistical rules apply as outlined below: 313 
1) The beliefs resulting from fusion are ranked from high to low. Due to uncertainty resulting from the  ambiguous maintenance 314 
terms, only the 2 failures with hight beliefs of failures are counted as positive.  315 
2) When a strong correspondence alarms occur, that is whenever A-M appears, failure can be confirmed with confidence. This 316 
situation is also defined as postive.    317 
Using these definitions, the calculation results are obtained and shown below. 318 
a. Results using the WT A342 BPA are shown in table X below. Its overall accuracy is 76%. 319 
TABLE X 320 
FALSE-POSITIVE AND FALSE-NEGATIVE RATES OF USING A342 BPA FOR FUSION 321 
Category Positive Negative Total 
Batteries Failure Cases 9 1 10 
Non Batteries Failure 
Cases 8 20 28 
Total 17 21 38 
False Positive 0.286 False Negative 0.1 
 322 
b. Using the entire wind farm BPA, the results are shown in table XI. Its overall accuracy is 86%. 323 
TABLE XI 324 
FALSE-POSITIVE AND FALSE-NEGATIVE RATES OF USING WIND FARM BPA FOR FUSION 325 
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Category Positive Negative Total 
Batteries Failure Cases 8 2 10 
Non Batteries Failure 
Cases 3 25 28 
Total 11 27 38 
False Positive 0.107 False Negative 0.2 
 326 
From the results shown in Tables X and XI, using a specific WT BPA to diagnose WT “Batteries Failures” generates about a 327 
30% false positive rate and a 10% false negative rate. The false positive rate and the false negative rate obtained from using wind 328 
farm BPA is about 10% and 20% respectively. Fault diagnosis accuracy using BPA derived from wind farm is higher than using 329 
BPA derived from a sample WT.   330 
B. Result Analysis  331 
The tests above show the fusion results using BPAs obtained from different data. Good fusion results are obtained by using the 332 
BPAs extracted from all the WTs in a wind farm. In the test, it is found that the uncertainties come from the ambiguity in the failure 333 
records “Pitch Failure”.  BPAs derived from the wind farm deliver relatively higher diagnosis accuracy.  334 
The tests reported above confirm that D-S evidence theory is capable of WT fault diagnosis. WT SCADA alarms provide multi-335 
dimensional information for failure diagnosis. The results also show that the diagnosis accuracy using this approach is affected by 336 
the quality of the maintenance records. Improving the specificity of the maintenance records should improve BPA estimation.  337 
Suggestions for such improvement are given below:  338 
①Maintenance data sheets should be standardized. Ambiguous (or general) descriptions of failure should be avoided. The 339 
records should be made according to a careful classification of failure modes.   340 
②Maintenance data descriptions should be classified according to the type of maintenance: “Corrective maintenance” and 341 
“Routine maintenance” should use different data sheets. By doing so, the statistics will be easier to calculate and higher quality 342 
BPAs should result. Invalid calculation due to routine maintenance for which no alarms are observed can be avoided. 343 
The merits of the current approach are summarized in the Table XII below by comparing it with the time-sequence and Venn 344 
diagram methods and neural network which have also been used for analyzing WT SCADA alarms. The method proposed in this 345 
paper shows that once alarms occur, the probability of failures (as indicated by specific maintenance activities) can be calculated 346 
with the BPA. The analysis effectively diagnoses the failures by showing the correlation between alarms and maintenance. This 347 
can be further used to review the redundancy of certain alarm installation. It potentially assists the system developer to understand 348 
and evaluation the system design, which distinguish this approach from model-based and artificial intelligent methods.  349 
TABLE XII 350 
 MERITS OF CURRENT APPROACH ON WT FAULT DIAGNOSIS 351 
Methods 
On-line 
Fault 
Diagnosis 
Fault 
Diagnosis 
Accuracy 
Root Cause 
Analysis 
Easy to 
perform 
Time - 
sequences 
Could 
be 
Not 
proved 
Not 
proved No 
Venn 
Diagram No 
Not 
proved Yes No 
Neural 
Network Yes Low No Yes 
D-S 
Evidence 
Theory Yes high Yes Yes 
 352 
The approach presented in this paper can be further developed into a practical tool for on-line fault diagnosis. It is expected to 353 
support maintenance decision making for wind farm management. A flowchart of the implementation process for a future online 354 
system is shown in Fig. 4. Historical alarm data from the SCADA system and maintenance records are used to generate BPAs with 355 
Bayesian approach.  BPAs obtained from historical data and online alarm data are fused based on D-S evidence theory to support 356 
maintenance decision making. After maintenance implementation, new maintenance records can be obtained and then used to 357 
update the historical data. Then a new BPA can be obtained which will be used for subsequent fault diagnosis. Therefore, a self-358 
BPA-generating procedure and online fault diagnosis process is constructed. In this process, once the BPA is obtained/updated the 359 
time used on information fusion which is triggered by the occurring of alarms is short. This helps to improve the effectiveness of 360 
the diagnosis system.       361 
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Historical 
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 362 
Fig. 4.  Online application of D-S evidence theory for alarm analysis 363 
 364 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 365 
The fault diagnosis accuracy of using different data sets to generate BPAs are compared and evaluated, which proves the 366 
effectiveness of this approach. Although from a statistical point of view, using data from a larger sample size (wind farm level) is 367 
better than using data from a small sample size ( a single WT), the comparable false positive and negative rate obtained shows the 368 
capability of this approach on dealing with relative small size data. The analysis also shows that this method is strong sensitive to 369 
the quality of maintenance records, which is reflected from the quantitative analysis of correlation between alarms and failures. It 370 
provides useful information for designers to understand the comprehensive system and perform corresponding optimization. This 371 
is the important advantage of the method proposed in this paper compared to current artificial intelligent approach on WT fault 372 
diagnosis which is still under the progress of using supervised learning method. The merits of the approach are then summarized 373 
and blueprint for future online application is also provided. 374 
The applicability of D-S evidence theory for the analysis of SCADA alarms for WTs fault diagnosis has been demonstrated. 375 
The approach proposed in this paper essentially combined the merits of SCADA alarm data availability with straightforward data 376 
analysis that makes limited demands on data storage space and computational capability. Compared to traditional fault diagnosis 377 
approaches, the method proposed in this paper has the advantages of being easy to perform, low cost and explainable. Accurate 378 
fault diagnosis underpins efficient operation and maintenance. The approach presented here provides a new and effective method 379 
for WTs fault diagnosis. 380 
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